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ABSTRACT
In a simple representative consumer model, vaccines and drug treatments yield the same revenue for
a pharmaceutical manufacturer, implying that the firm would have the same incentive to develop either
ceteris paribus. We provide more realistic models in which the revenue equivalence breaks down for
two reasons. First, drug treatments are sold after the firm has learned who has contracted the disease;
in the case of heterogeneous consumers who vary with respect to the probability of contracting the
disease, there is less asymmetric information to prevent the firm from extracting consumer surplus with
drug treatments than with vaccines. We prove that, due to this aspect of pharmaceutical pricing, the ratio
of drug-treatment to vaccine revenue can be arbitrarily high; we calculate that the ratio is about two to
one for empirical distributions of HIV risk. The second reason for the breakdown of revenue
equivalence is that vaccines are more likely to interfere with the spread of the disease than are drug
treatments, thus reducing demand for the product. By embedding an economic model within a standard
dynamic epidemiological model, we show that the steady-state flow of revenue is greater for drug
treatments than for vaccines.
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mkremer@fas.harvard.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is conventionally believed that pharmaceutical manufacturers prefer to develop drug treatments
(medicines administered after a disease has been contracted) rather than vaccines (medicines that
prevent healthy people from ever contracting the disease). Patricia Thomas, journalist and author
of a widely publicized book on the search for an AIDS vaccine (Thomas 2001), notes,
Private companies find vaccines less financially rewarding than drugs. In 2001, the
global marketplace for therapeutic drugs exceeded $300 billion, whereas worldwide
vaccine sales were only about $5 billion .... It is not hard to understand why major
pharmaceutical companies, capable of developing drugs and preventive vaccines,
generally invest in drugs that patients must take every day rather than shots given
only occasionally. Drug company executives have investors to answer to, after all.
(Thomas 2002)
The case of HIV is consistent with this conventional belief that pharmaceutical firms are more
inclined to invest in drug treatments than in vaccines: although it may certainly be in part due
to differing degrees of scientific difficulty, drug treatments for HIV/AIDS have been developed,
but as yet there is no HIV vaccine.
Thomas’ explanation of why firms prefer drug treatments to vaccines—that is, that drug treat-
ments are administered more frequently, allowing firms more opportunities to extract revenue—
appears to be widely held (for example, see also Rosenberg 1999). Yet from the perspective of
neoclassical economics, this explanation seems odd because a rational consumer would pay the
expected present value of the stream of benefits in an up front lump sum for the vaccine, and
thus by this argument vaccines and treatments should yield equivalent revenues.
While behavioral economics may provide reasons why people are willing to pay more for a
cure than for prevention, in this paper we examine two ways in which the view that firms are bi-
ased toward developing drug treatments can be reconciled with standard neoclassical economics.
In Section 2, we show that if one moves from a representative consumer model to a more realis-
tic model with heterogeneous consumers, revenue equivalence between vaccines and treatments
1breaks down. It is indeed realistic to suppose that consumers are heterogeneous in their ex ante
probabilities of contracting the disease. Take asa ne x a m p l et h ec a s eo fH I V :p e o p l ee n g a g i n gi n
unprotected sex with many partners have a higher risk of contracting HIV than do those with few
partners. We show in this paper that treatments extract revenue from heterogeneous consumers
more effectively than vaccines. Since vaccines are administered before consumers contract the
disease, there is no basis on which the firm can discriminate among the consumers. If the firm
attempts to charge a high price for the vaccine, only consumers at high risk of contracting the
disease will buy it, but this segment is often only a small fraction of the population. On the
other hand, at the point when treatments are administered, the firm has better information about
consumers; in particular, the firm at least knows which consumers have the disease and which
do not. The firm can use this information to charge high prices to all consumers who contract
the disease, regardless of whether they come from the small segment of the population at high
risk or the large segment of the population at low risk.
A simple example suffices to illustrate this point. Suppose there are 100 total consumers,
ninety of whom have a ten percent chance of contracting the disease and ten of whom have a 100
percent chance. Suppose consumers are risk neutral and are willing to pay 100,000 to be cured
of the disease if they contract it. A monopolist selling a vaccine could either charge 100,000 and
sell to the ten high-risk consumers or charge 10,000 and sell to all 100 of them. Either way, the
monopolist’s revenue is 1,000,000. A monopolist selling a treatment would, in expectation, sell
to the nineteen consumers contracting the disease (all ten of the high risk consumers as well as
an average of nine consumers from the low-risk group) at a price of 100,000 for a total revenue
of 1,900,000, almost twice the revenue from a vaccine.
In Section 2.2 we develop a formal model in which the probability of contracting a disease
for consumer i, xi, is a random variable with distribution function F(xi). We prove that for
any distribution with a non-trivial amount of consumer heterogeneity, a treatment yields more
revenue than a similarly effective vaccine. We prove that there exist distributions of consumer
2heterogeneity for which the ratio of treatment to vaccine revenue is arbitrarily high. While
our results are proved in the simplest possible setting in which vaccines and drug treatments
produce the exact same social benefits, given the substantial gap in revenue between the two, it
is straightforward to argue by continuity that there will exist a broad range of cases in which
the social benefit from a vaccine exceeds that from a drug treatment, yet the revenue advantage
of the drug treatment will induce the firm to develop a drug treatment rather than a vaccine. In
Section 2.3 we show how our results can be applied to estimates of two actual distributions of
expected risk in populations to bound the treatment/vaccine revenue gap. Such estimates can be
used to calculate the subsidies needed to induce firms to develop vaccines rather than treatments
where the relative social benefit of vaccines is large relative to treatments.
In Section 3 we consider a dynamic model and reveal additional disadvantages of vaccines
relative to drug treatments in terms of rent extraction. Because vaccines cause greater reductions
in disease transmission than drug treatments, it is more difficult for developers to capture the full
social benefit of their medicine. We examine the effects of disease transmission on pricing and
research and development (R&D) decisions by embedding an economic model within a standard
dynamic epidemiological model, which we use to solve for the optimal price and profits for both
vaccines and drug treatments. We show that the steady-state flow of revenue for drug treatments
is greater than for vaccines, and thus that R&D expenditures will be distorted towards drug
treatments rather than vaccines. The fraction of social benefits that the private developer of a
vaccine captures declines with disease prevalence.
Sections 2 and 3 focus on the case of private markets for pharmaceuticals; however, in
practice, governments are often large purchasers. In Section 4, we argue that if the prices the
government pays for vaccines and drug treatments are influenced by the threat point of profits
the firm could realize on the private market if bargaining breaks down, then to the extent that
vaccines are less profitable than drug treatments on the private market, they will also be less
profitable when sold to the government.
3It is worth noting that a preference for investing in drug treatments over vaccines will have
particularly detrimental consequences for developing countries. Vaccines are more suited for use
in developing countries with weak medical infrastructure: they do not require prior diagnosis;
do not need to be taken on a long term basis but instead require only a few doses; do not
typically have major side effects that need to be monitored; and can more easily be delivered
by personnel with limited medical training. As an illustration, consider that while three-quarters
of the world’s children receive a standard package of cheap, off-patent vaccines through the
World Health Organization’s Expanded Program on Immunization (Kim-Farley et al. 1992), it
is estimated that only 10,000 to 30,000 of the 25 million people infected with HIV in Africa
have access to antiretroviral therapies, at least in part due to difficulties with safe and effective
delivery of the drugs (World Health Organization 2001).
To our knowledge, our comparison of drug treatments and vaccines in the static model with
heterogenous consumers is new in the literature.1 Our analysis of the bounds on the profitability
of drug treatments relative to vaccines in Propositions 5 and 6 also represents a contribution.
One might look to the industrial organization literature for a related result since, as we argue, the
relationship between drug treatments and vaccines in our model is analogous to the relationship
between price discrimination and uniform pricing. However, the industrial organization literature
provides bounds on the social welfare from price discrimination relative to uniform pricing
(Malueg 1993) but not bounds on a monopolist’s relative profits, to which our results apply.
Our dynamic extension is based on a standard epidemiological model. In a related model,
Geoffard and Philipson (1997) show that if a vaccine is produced by firms with market power
and sold on the private market, the disease will not be eradicated in the steady state. Our work
differs because we explicitly derive the optimal monopoly price and profits for vaccines, and the
1We have become aware of contemporaneous research by Kessing and Nuscheler (2002) that is related to our
static model. Their analysis is quite different from ours since their underlying model involves income heterogeneity
rather than disease-risk heterogeneity. In addition, they consider vaccines alone rather than compare vaccines to drug
treatments.
4fraction of vaccines’ social value appropriated by developers. Furthermore, our analysis of drug
treatments, our comparison of drug treatments to vaccines, and our result that R&D expenditures
will be distorted towards drug treatments in a dynamic model are new.
2 Static Model
2.1 Homogeneous Consumers
A monopoly pharmaceutical manufacturer, called the firm, has the choice of developing alternative
medicines for a disease affecting a population of consumers. The timing of the model is given
in Figure 1. First, the firm chooses which of the alternative medicines to develop: a vaccine,
the term we give to a medicine administered before consumers contract the disease, or a drug
treatment, the term we give to a medicine administered after. To fix ideas, we will suppose the
firm’s choices are mutually exclusive: it will develop either a vaccine or a drug treatment but not
both.2 Let kj ∈ [0,∞) be the present discounted value of the fixed cost of developing medicine
j,w h e r ej = v for the vaccine and j = t for the drug treatment. Let cj ∈ [0,∞) be the present
discounted value of the cost of administering medicine j to an individual consumer. Note that the
drug treatment may be administered later in a consumer’s life than a vaccine, and so the nominal
cost of the drug treatment may be discounted more heavily than the vaccine, but such discounting
is reflected in the terms cv and ct since they are expressed as present discounted values. Let
ej ∈ [0,1] be the efficacy of medicine j, that is, the probability that medicine j prevents the
consumer from experiencing any harm from the disease. Let σj ∈ [0,1] be the probability that a
consumer experiences side effects from medicine j and sj ∈ [0,∞) the present discounted value
of the harm from the side effects conditional on experiencing them. Let Pj ∈ [0,∞) be the
present discounted value of the price the firm receives for medicine j.
2Given the normalizations adopted later in the paper, we will show (Propositions 4 and 9) the firm does not
prefer to develop both a vaccine and a drug treatment.
5Interpreting Pj as a net price the firm receives for medicine j allows for a consistent rep-
resentation of the legal/liability costs associated with side effects. Assuming a caveat emptor
regime in which the consumer bears the liability for harm, consumers’ willingness to pay will be
reduced by the harm they expect from side effects, and Pj will reflect a discount for this lower
willingness to pay. Assuming a caveat venditor regime in which the firm bears liability for harm,
Pj can be interpreted as the price the firm receives after subtracting off payments it makes to
consumers for damages. Other exogenous legal/liability costs can be embodied in kj if the costs
are fixed or in cj if the costs vary with the number of consumers who receive the medicine.
Before pursuing any medicine, consumer i learns the probability that he or she will contract
the disease, xi ∈ [0,1]. To capture the notion that consumers are homogeneous, we will assume
that xi takes on a single value, which is public information for consumers and the firm.3 Whether
or not consumer i contracts the disease is represented by Bernoulli random variable di,w h e r e
di =1indicates i contracts the disease, an event which occurs with probability xi,a n ddi =0
indicates i does not contract the disease, an event which occurs with probability 1−xi.W i t h o u t
loss of generality, assume di is public information, observable not only to consumer i but also to
the firm.4
As Figure 1 shows, the key difference between a vaccine and a drug treatment hinges on
when the medicine is administered relative to the realization of di. A vaccine is administered
before di is realized and a drug treatment is administered after.
Suppose consumers are risk neutral. If a consumer contracts a disease and has not had a
vaccine or does not receive a drug treatment, he or she experiences harm h ∈ [0,∞) in present
discounted value terms. Normalize the mass of consumers to unity.
3The case in which consumers are homogeneous but in which the firm does not know x is formally identical
to the case of heterogeneous consumers drawn from a distribution known to the firm. We will treat this case in
Section 2.2.
4To see that this assumption can be made without loss of generality, consider two cases. First, if the firm has
developed a vaccine rather than a drug treatment, the firm does not make any decisions conditional on di,s oi ti s
immaterial whether it can observe di. Second, if the firm has developed a drug treatment rather than a vaccine, the
firm can indirectly observe who has contracted the disease by observing who demands the drug treatment.
6First, consider the firm’s profit from a vaccine. A consumer’s expected net surplus from a
vaccine is xihev − σvsv − Pv. That is, with probability ev the vaccine is effective and provides
a benefit to the consumer in that expected harm xih is avoided. From this benefit, the expected
harm from side effects σvsv and the price Pv have to be subtracted to yield net consumer surplus.
The profit maximizing price extracts all this surplus; hence P ∗
v = xihev −σvsv. Since consumers
are of unit mass, the firm’s maximum profit from the vaccine is
P
∗
v − cv − kv = xihev − σvsv − cv − kv. (1)
Next, consider the firm’s profit from a drug treatment. The consumer will only purchase
the drug treatment if he or she contracts the disease. Conditional on contracting the disease,
the consumer’s net consumer surplus from the drug treatment is het − σtst − Pt. The profit
maximizing price extracts all this surplus; hence P ∗
t = het − σtst. Since consumers are of unit




t − ct) − kt = xi(het − σtst − ct) − Kt. (2)
Using expressions (1) and (2), we can characterize which medicine the firm chooses to
develop.
Proposition 1. In the homogeneous consumer model, the firm strictly prefers to develop the
vaccine over the drug treatment if and only if (1) strictly exceeds (2), strictly prefers to develop
a drug treatment over a vaccine if and only if (2) strictly exceeds (1), and is indifferent if (1)
equals (2).
In view of Proposition 1, it is straightfoward to perform comparative statics analyses on the
various parameters. Ceteris paribus, the firm tends to prefer to develop a vaccine over a drug
treatment if it is cheaper to develop (i.e., kv is low relative to kt)o rc h e a p e rt op r o d u c e( cv is
7low relative to ct). The firm tends to prefer a vaccine if it involves less severe side effects (σv
and sv are low relative to σt and st, respectively). The firm tends to prefer a vaccine if it is a
more effective cure (ev is high relative to et).
Obviously this model does not exhaust the list of factors that might lead the firm to prefer
vaccines over drug treatments or vice versa. However, it would be straightforward to extend the
model to consider alternative factors, and we will briefly mention a few here. First, if consumers
were assumed to be risk averse, vaccines would become relatively more profitable, since they
would provide insurance to consumers for which consumers would pay a premium. Second, the
effect of assuming consumers face liquidity constraints is less clear, depending on the nature
of the constraint assumed. If the liquidity constraint is a constraint on lifetime expenditures,
say because the consumer has access to relatively efficient credit markets, then the liquidity
constraint may bind less with vaccines than with drug treatments. To see this, recall that we
found the equilibrium price for the vaccine to be P ∗
v = xihev − σvsv and for drug treatment
to be P ∗
t = het − σtst. Adopting the ceteris paribus assumptions that ev = et, σv = σt,a n d
sv = st,i ti se v i d e n tt h a tP ∗
v <P ∗
t for all xi < 1. Hence, conditional on contracting the disease,
total payments are lower with vaccines. This type of lifetime liquidity constraint would bias
the firm in favor of vaccines. If, on the other hand, the liquidity constraint were a per-period
constraint, say because the consumer does not have access to credit, then the liquidity constraint
may bind less with drug treatments since the total payment with drug treatments may be spread
out in installments (with a payment for each separate treatment) whereas the total payment for
the vaccine would need to be paid in a lump sum at the time the vaccine is administered. This
type of liquidity constraint would bias the firm in favor of drug treatments.
The conclusions drawn from Proposition 1—that is, that the firm prefers cheaper, more
effective medicines associated with fewer side effects—are both intuitive and well-known. To
focus on the more subtle issues that are the focus of this paper, we will normalize certain
variables so that the firm is indifferent between developing vaccines and drug treatments in the
8homogeneous consumer model. In particular, throughout the remainder of the paper, we will
normalize kj = cj = σj =0and ej =1for j = v,t. That is, we will assume that both
medicines are costless to develop and produce, have no side effects, and are perfectly effective.
The following revenue-equivalence result for the case of homogeneous consumers is an immediate
corollary of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. Assume kj = cj = σj =0and ej =1for j = v,t. Then the firm is indifferent
between developing the vaccine and the drug treatment in the homogeneous consumer model.
We will show in the next subsection that drug treatments are more profitable than vaccines
in a heterogeneous consumer model.
2.2 Heterogeneous Consumers
In this subsection, we will adopt the preceding model with one modification. As before, consumer
i learns the probability that he or s h ew i l lc o n t r a c tt h ed i s e a s e ,xi ∈ [0,1],b e f o r ep u r s u i n ga n y
medicine. Now, however, we assume xi is a random variable distributed according to a nontrivial
cumulative distribution function F(xi). Each consumer in the population has a type given by
an independent draw from this distribution. Variable xi is private information for the consumer;
the firm only knows the distribution from which xi is drawn. We are attempting to capture the
fact that the consumer’s background and/or actions put him or her into a risk category that he or
she can observe more accurately than can outsiders. For example, engaging in unprotected sex
with multiple partners or in intravenous drug use would put a person at higher risk of contracting
HIV, but such behaviors would be difficult for a firm to monitor accurately enough to be able to
charge a discriminatory price. Likewise, frequenting mosquito-infested tropical regions increases
the chance of contracting malaria, but again may be difficult to monitor accurately.
Normalize kj = cj = σj =0and ej =1for j = v,t as before. That is, both medicines are
costless to develop and produce and both are perfectly effective. These normalizations allow us
to concentrate on the revenue generated by each medicine in a heterogeneous consumer model.
9Consider first the firm’s profit maximization problem if it decides to develop a vaccine. Given
that consumers’ types xi are private information, the firm is forced to charge a uniform price.
S i n c ec o n s u m e r sa r er i s kn e u t r a l ,c o n s u m e ri will buy the vaccine if the price Pv is less than
the expected harm from the disease, hxi, which represents i’s probability xi of contracting the
disease times the harm h from the disease conditional on contracting it. Thus there exists a cutoff
type ˆ xv = Pv/h such that consumer i weakly prefers to buy if and only if xi ≥ ˆ xv. The firm’s
expected revenue from the vaccine, also equal to its profit given the assumption of zero costs,
is
R 1
ˆ xv PvdF(xi). Substituting Pv = hˆ xv and rearranging, the firm’s profit from the vaccine is
hˆ xv[1−F(ˆ xv)]. The firm will choose ˆ xv, which is equivalent to choosing Pv, to maximize profit;
thus, we can write the monopoly profit from vaccine as
Πv =m a x
ˆ x∈[0,1]
{hˆ x[1 − F(ˆ x)]}. (3)
Next consider the firm’s profit maximization problem if it decides to develop a drug treatment.
Any consumer who has contracted the disease (i such that di =1 ) would be willing to pay a price
up to the avoided harm h. The firm’s optimal price for the drug treatment fully extracts consumer
surplus: P ∗
t = h. Of course consumers will only pay Pt if they happen to contract the disease,
which occurs for consumer i with probability xi. The maximum revenue (and, equivalently, the





where E(·) is the expectations operator.
Before formally examining the profits from the vaccine, Πv, and the drug treatment, Πt,
we can gain intuition by analyzing the graphical illustration in Figure 2. The vaccine involves
charging a uniform price to all consumers. A price of hˆ x, for example, will induce only those
consumers with xi ≥ ˆ x to purchase, so total revenue (and profit) would be given by the price
10hˆ x times the mass of consumers in [ˆ x,1], which graphically is the probability-weighted area of
rectangle B in the figure. Of course the firm would choose the price optimally, so Πv can be seen
in the figure as the rectangle B of greatest probability-weighted area that can be inscribed in the
larger triangle ABC. On the other hand, Πt is the probability-weighted area of the triangle ABC
itself. To see this, note each type xi pays h for the drug treatment conditional on contracting
the disease, which occurs with probability xi, thus producing an expected revenue of hxi for
each consumer. Integrating over consumers with respect to their density gives revenues (and,
equivalently, profit) Πt. Combining these figures, we can see Πt exceeds Πv by the probability-
weighted area of A plus C.N om a t t e rh o wB is inscribed, triangles A and C will have positive
area, and so Πt > Πv. Formally, we have the following proposition, proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 3. If the population of consumers with a positive probability of contracting the
disease is nontrivially heterogeneous (that is, at least two distinct subintervals of (0,1] have
positive measure), then Πt > Πv. Hence the firm’s profit from developing a drug treatment is
higher than from developing a vaccine.
A few remarks about the proposition are in order. First, note that the proposition holds for
general distributions, including discrete, continuous, and mixed. Second, note that a two point
distribution in which one of the points is xi =0is effectively homogeneous, because the relevant
population for revenue considerations includes only those consumers with a positive probability
of contracting the disease, and this relevant population would in this case then have a single-point
distribution.
Further intuition for Proposition 3 can be obtained by reconsidering the problem of medicine
choice in terms of price discrimination. A vaccine constrains the firm to charge a uniform price
both from an ex ante and an ex post perspective. A drug treatment also constrains the firm
to charge a uniform price from an ex post perspective; that is, all consumers who contract the
d i s e a s ep a yt h es a m ep r i c e .F r o ma nex ante perspective, however, consumers’ expected payments
for a drug treatment are not uniform. High risk consumers will pay for the drug treatment with
high probability, thus leading to a high expected payment from an ex ante perspective; the
11opposite is true for low risk consumers. A drug treatment tailors the ex ante expected price to
the value consumers place on avoiding the disease. From an ex ante perspective, drug treatments
effectively allow the firm to engage in third degree price discrimination, wherease vaccines result
in a uniform pricing situation. It is a general result in the industrial organization literature that
monopolists are able to extract more rent from consumers using third degree price discrimination
than using uniform prices (see, e.g., Varian 1989), just as illustrated by the firm considered here.
We have implicitly assumed that the firm develops one of the two medicines but not both.
Given the normalization kv = kt =0 , implying that the medicines are costless to develop, it might
be thought the firm could do better by developing both and using them in a complicated mixed-
bundling scheme. In fact, as the next proposition shows, the firm does not prefer to develop
both, justifying our focus on exclusive development. The proof of Proposition 4, provided in
the Appendix, relies on the fact that the firm extracts 100 percent of social welfare with a drug
treatment, so a vaccine would provide no additional benefit.
Proposition 4. The firm does not strictly prefer developing both a drug treatment and a vaccine
to developing a drug treatment alone.
We have shown that the firm earns more revenue from drug treatments than from vaccines,
raising the question of how much more revenue drug treatments can extract. We will answer
this question in a series of propositions, starting with the case in which xi is a discrete random
variable of arbitrary form, and building from there.
Suppose that consumers fall into R risk classes indexed by r =1 ,...,R. Within each risk
class r, consumers have the same probability xr of contracting the disease. Consumers observe
their risk class, but the firm cannot. We will arrange the risk classes without loss of generality
such that 0 ≤ x1 ≤ ··· ≤ xR ≤ 1. Let mr ∈ (0,1) be the mass of consumers in risk class r
and normalize the mass of the total population such that
PR
r=1 mr is equal to one. Note that this
setup captures the case in which an individual i’s probability of contracting the disease xi is a
discrete random variable of arbitrary form. The next proposition shows that the number of risk
12classes determines a tight upper bound on the amount the profit from a drug treatment exceeds
that from a vaccine, and this proposition will serve as a useful building block for subsequent
results.
Proposition 5. For any ²>0, there exist distributions of consumers in R risk classes such that
Πt/Πv >R− ². That is, we can find distributions of consumers in R risk classes such that the
profit from a drug treatment can be made arbitrarily close to R times the profit from a vaccine.
Moreover, R is an upper bound on Πt/Πv.
In the proof of Proposition 5, contained in the Appendix, we construct a distribution of
consumers in which the masses of the R risk classes {mr}R
r=1 decline geometrically. Further,
we specify probabilities {xr}R
r=1 such that the firm earns the same profit whether it sells to all
consumers at a low price hx1, to all consumers but the lowest risk class at a higher price hx2,
etc., on up to selling to the highest risk class alone at price hxR.
We note that Proposition 5 has a straightforward corollary in the simplest possible case of
consumer heterogeneity, that is, the two type case with a low risk class and a high risk class.
The example from the Introduction (with 100 consumers, 90 of whom have a ten percent chance
of contracting the disease and ten of whom have a 100 percent chance) is such a case. As noted
in the Introduction, the drug treatment produces higher profit than the vaccine by a factor of 1.9.
Proposition 5 implies that a drug treatment can be as much as twice as profitable as a vaccine
in the two type case, but no more. The example given in the Introduction approaches our bound
of two, and we can come closer to the bound with examples in which the size of the high risk
pool as well as the probability of contracting the disease in the low risk pool are reduced. For
example, consider a population of 100 consumers, 99 of whom have a one percent chance of
contracting the disease, and one of whom has a 100 percent chance. Then it can be shown, given
the assumption from the Introduction that the harm from the disease is 100,000, that a vaccine
produces a profit of 100,000 while drug treatment produces a profit of 199,000, very nearly twice
as much profit.
The two type case provides important insights into the settings in which firms will strongly
13prefer drug treatments to vaccines. Skewed distributions in which there exist a large segment of
the population with a very small probability of contracting the disease and a small segment of
the population with a large probability of contracting the disease will create the largest relative
incentives for the firm to develop drug treatments.
An obvious corollary of Proposition 5 is that there exist distributions of consumer types such
that drug treatments are arbitrarily more profitable than vaccines. This can be seen by taking
the limit as R approaches infinity in the proposition. Stated formally, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 6. For any finite bound M ∈ (0,∞), there exist distributions of consumers such
that Πt/Πv >M.
By themselves, Propositions 3 and 6 do not raise public policy concerns. The propositions
were proved under maintained assumptions which guarantee that the social benefit from vaccines
and drug treatments are equal, so no problems arise if the firm is biased toward developing drug
treatments because of better rent extraction properties. Given the substantial profit advantage that
drug treatments potentially have over vaccines, it is easy to see by continuity that there will exist
a broad range of cases in which vaccines are socially more beneficial than drug treatments and yet
the firm is still biased toward developing drug treatments. Because a vaccine is administered at
an early stage, it may be more effective in preventing the disease’s spread, may reduce the harm
the disease causes an individual, and indeed may increase the probability of curing the disease
as compared to a drug treatment. Yet, if the revenue extraction advantage of a drug treatment
is great enough, the firm will still have an incentive to develop a drug treatment rather than a
vaccine.
Our model has considered the case where the only source of heterogeneity is in consumers’
probability of contracting the disease. More realistically, people may differ in willingness to
pay for a given reduction in their probability of infection either because they differ in income
14or because they differ in the value they attach to prevention of the disease.5 It is possible to
imagine bivariate distributions for which vaccines could be more profitable than drug treatments.
Suppose the chance of infection is perfectly inversely correlated with the willingness to pay for
reductions in probability of infection, for example because individuals who are unconcerned about
their health are the most likely to have multiple partners and the least likely to be willing to pay
for per-unit reductions in the chance of infection. In this case, all consumers would have the
same willingness to pay for a vaccine and the firm could extract all surplus with a vaccine but
not with a drug treatment. However, this is unlikely, and we would conjecture that for most
reasonable bivariate distributions of chance of infection and willingness to pay, vaccines will
offer less opportunity for price discrimination than drugs.
2.3 Applications to Empirical Distributions
In this section, we apply our theoretical results to estimates of actual distributions of HIV risk
in certain populations. We consider two examples, one using a nationally representative sample
but containing only crude risk information, and another using a non-representative sample but
containing more detailed information on risk. The first example uses nationally-representative
data from the United States Center for Disease Control National Health and Examination Survey
(NHANES) in 1999-2000 to divide the population into risk classes based on the number of sexual
partners in a twelve month period.6 The second example involves a smaller population for which
we have more detailed data, data from a study of p r o j e c t e dH I Vr i s kw h i c hs u r v e y e dar a n d o m
sample of individuals living in poor neighborhoods with high drug use in Houston, Texas (Bell
and Trevino 1999). The result from the previous subsection that there are theoretical distributions
of risk for which drug treatments generate considerably more revenue than vaccines is borne out
5Kessing and Nuscheler (2002) analyze a static model with income heterogeneity.
6We do not allow for separate risk factors based on sex of the respondent or of his or her partners and, due to
data limitations, we assume that all men who reported having male partners had no female partners (and analogously
for women with female partners).
15f o rt h ea c t u a ld i s t r i b u t i o n so fr i s ka n a l y z e di nb o t he x a m p l e s .
For our first example, assume the risk of contracting a disease from one sexual partner is φ;
thus, we treat risk of contracting the disease as a linear function of the number of sexual partners.
Assume a unit mass of consumers with distribution of sexual partners as in NHANES (1999–
2000), normalize the harm experienced conditional on contracting the disease to h =1 ,a n d
maintain all previous normalizations (that is, that medicines are costless to develop and produce,
are perfectly effective, etc.). We will compute the revenue from a drug treatment and a vaccine
and then compare the two figures. Given the normalizations, the revenue from a drug treatment
is equal to the fraction of the population that is expected to contract the disease, which in turn
is equal to φ times the mean number of sexual partners 1.666. Thus the revenue from a drug
treatment is 1.666φ. To compute the revenue from a vaccine, we can compute (as in Table 1) the
maximum price that induces each risk class to purchase (and strictly induces higher risk classes
to purchase), and then find the highest revenue. Reading down the last column of Table 1, the
highest revenue is gained from selling to the entire population that is sexually active at price φ,
which yields 0.8991φ in revenue. Thus, the ratio of revenue from a drug treatment to revenue
from a vaccine is 1.853, so a drug treatment would generate almost twice as much revenue as a
vaccine.
In our second example, we consider a study that directly provides estimates of projected
HIV risk, Bell and Trevino (1999). The authors collected quite detailed information on 270
subjects living in poor Houston neighborhoods, including records of all the subjects’ sexual
acts over a given thirty day period. The authors used the data from this survey to parametrize
an epidemiological model of HIV risk which combines risk behaviors, prevalence rates, and
transmission probabilities. The 270 individuals in Bell and Trevino’s sample are not representative
of the U.S. population as a whole. In particular, 14 percent could be expected to develop HIV
within ten years, an order of magnitude notably higher than the national average. Assuming
a static population with no change in the prevalence of HIV within the population as well as
16no change in the risk level of new sexual partners over time, this model then allows them to
compute an empirical distribution of the ten-year projected risk of contracting HIV for the given
population. The resulting empirical distribution (based on data from Figure 1 in Bell and Trevino)
i sp r e s e n t e di nt h ef i r s tt w oc o l u m n so fT a b l e2 .
Assuming a unit mass of consumers with the same distribution of HIV risk as in Table 2,
normalizing the harm experienced conditional on contracting HIV to h =1 , and maintaining all
the other previous normalizations, we can compute the potential revenue from an HIV vaccine
and an HIV/AIDS drug treatment. The revenue from a drug treatment equals the expected number
of infected individuals times the avoided harm h =1 , or 0.1424. To compute the revenue from
a vaccine, we can compute (as in Table 2) the maximum price that induces each risk class to
purchase (and strictly induces higher risk classes to purchase), and then find the highest revenue.
Reading down the last column of the table, the highest revenue, 0.0694, is generated by charging
a price that induces the 75 percent risk class and higher to purchase. Thus the ratio of drug
treatment revenue to vaccine revenue is 2.052, so a drug treatment would again generate more
than twice as much revenue as a vaccine.
Despite the fact that the distribution of HIV risk in Bell and Trevino’s sample is likely to
be less skewed than in the U.S. population as a whole, it is still somewhat skewed. Only nine
percent of the mass of consumers have risks at or above 75 percent. Serving only these high risk
consumers with a vaccine leaves a large mass of consumers from lower risk classes unserved,
and thus leaves a great deal of unclaimed consumer surplus.
3D y n a m i c M o d e l
In this section we show that drug treatments are more profitable than vaccines even with a
homogeneous population if vaccines cause greater reductions in disease transmission than drug
treatments. Vaccines typically reduce disease transmission more than drug treatments for two
17reasons. First, people often spread the disease before receiving treatment. For example, much
transmission of HIV is believed to take place during the first few months of an individual’s
infection;7 during this “window period,” viral loads (and thus transmission rates) are high,8 but
the individual is not producing enough antibodies to test positive on standard HIV tests, and thus
will not seek drug treatments such as the Highly Active Antiretroviral Treatments (HAARTs).
Second, drug treatments sometimes treat symptoms rather than actually curing the disease, so
even if a patient receiving a treatment is experiencing no harm from the disease, he or she may
still be a carrier.
To examine the effect of disease transmission on pricing and R&D expenditure decisions, it is
useful to embed the economic model within a standard dynamic epidemiological model. We will
consider a non-fatal disease since this simplifiesm o d e l i n gb ya l l o w i n gu st oc o n s i d e rac o n s t a n t
population. Assume that people are born into the population at rate δ and that both infected
and uninfected individuals die at rate δ as well. Let S, I,a n dV represent the fractions of the
population that are susceptible, infected, and vaccinated. Normalizing the mass of the consumer
population to unity, S + I + V =1 . If no vaccine exists, V =0and S + I =1 .
The rate at which people become newly infected is βIS,w h e r eβ depends on the rate at
which susceptibles contact infecteds and the proportion of those contacts which lead to new
infections. Let ξ denote the fraction of newborns who are vaccinated.9 For now, we treat ξ as a
parameter; later, we will solve for the equilibrium value of ξ and substitute that value back into
this epidemiological model.
The rate of change of the susceptible population is equal to the birth rate times the non-
7Wawer et al. (2003) report that in their study approximately half of all HIV transmission was estimated to occur
within the first five months of an individual’s seroconversion (seroconversion usually takes place two to six weeks
after acquisition of HIV).
8Wawer et al. (2003) show the rate of HIV transmission per coital act is highest in the first five months after
seroconversion (0.0081 per coital act).
9Given the Poisson structure of the model, without loss of generality we can treat all vaccinations as if they are
given to newborns.
18vaccination rate, 1 − ξ, minus the loss of susceptibles to infection or death:
˙ S = δ(1 − ξ) − βIS− δS. (5)
The rate of change of the infected population is
˙ I = βIS− δI (6)
and the rate of change of the vaccinated population is
˙ V = δξ − δV. (7)
There is a trivial steady state in which I∗ =0and S∗ =1− V ∗, but this is unstable for









for ξ < 1 − δ/β. For brevity we will define λ = δ/β. This term can be interpreted as the latent
proportion of healthy individuals in the steady state before a vaccine is introduced, as can be
seen by setting ξ =0in the equation for I∗ in (8). With this notation, the steady-state rate at





v = δ(1 − ξ − λ) (9)





t = δ(1 − λ). (10)
We wish to consider a firm’s incentives for developing either a vaccine or a drug treatment.
(We will show below in Proposition 9 that the firm will not choose to develop both.) Once
developed, we assume that either medicine can be produced at zero cost. We suppose that a person
taking a vaccine does not contract the disease and is unable to transmit the disease to others. We
assume that a single dose of a drug treatment perfectly relieves all symptoms permanently but
still allows the treated individual to transmit the disease to others. These assumptions are clearly
extreme, but results will be qualitatively similar as long as drug treatments interfere less with
disease transmission than do vaccines.
We will consider the case as the discount rate goes to zero so that consumers only care about
their probability of contracting the disease (not when they will contract it) and the firm wants to
maximize the steady-state flow of revenue; this allows us to abstract from transitional dynamics.
Assume consumers are risk neutral, and define h to be the fixed amount a consumer will be
willing to pay in order to avoid infection.
Revenue (and profit since production costs have been normalized to zero), Πj,w i l le q u a l
price, Pj, multiplied by quantity sold, Qj,w h e r ej = v if a vaccine is developed and j = t if a
drug treatment is developed. Let Wj denote social welfare. Let P ∗
j , Q∗
j, Π∗
j,a n dW ∗
j denote the
equilibrium price, quantity, profit, and social welfare in the steady state, respectively.
We proceed by solving for the firm’s profit-maximizing prices P ∗
v and P ∗
t , using these prices
to compute the steady-state flow profits Π∗
v and Π∗
t, and then comparing these profits to determine
which medicine is more profitable in the steady state. The results are contained in a series of
propositions.
Proposition 7. In the steady state of the dynamic model wi t had r u gt r e a t m e n t ,t h ee q u i l i b r i u m
20price is P ∗
t = h, quantity is Q∗
t = δ(1 − λ), flow profit is Π∗
t = hδ(1 − λ) and flow welfare is
W∗
t = hδ(1 − λ).
The proof of Proposition 7 is straightforward. The firm sets a price extracting all the surplus from
infecteds, P ∗
t = h. Since we assumed that one dose of the drug treatment permanently relieves all
symptoms, only newly infected consumers will purchase the drug treatment. In equilibrium, all
newly infecteds buy the drug treatment at price P ∗
t = h, so by equation (10), Q∗
t = δ(1−λ).T h e
resulting flow profit is thus Π∗
t = P∗
t Q∗
t = hδ(1 − λ). The social benefit of the drug treatment
is that all newly infected individuals are completely relieved of the harm from the disease h,s o
W∗
t = hδ(1 − λ).
It is more difficult to derive a rational-expectations equilibrium in the vaccine case because
of the externality involved. The more consumers who are vaccinated, the lower the disease
prevalence, thus reducing the incentives of consumers to be vaccinated. We will solve for the
equilibrium of this system, drawn in Figure 3. The diagram is drawn for a given vaccine price
Pv; below we will solve for the profit maximizing Pv. The solid line AA0 represents consumer
demand for vaccines as a function of the the overall infection level and the given price, Qv(Iv,P v).
As the line indicates, there is a cutoff level of infection prevalence ˆ I such that no consumer buys
the vaccine below this cutoff, all consumers buy the vaccine above this cutoff, and consumers
are indifferent exactly at this cutoff so that the fraction of newborns obtaining the vaccine is
indeterminate. The dotted line BB0 represents the infection level as a function of the quantity
of vaccine consumed, Iv(Qv), which comes from the epidemiological model; in particular, this
follows directly from the equation for I∗ in (8). The equilibrium quantity as a function of price
is given by the intersection of AA0 and BB0. Note that an increase in price shifts AA0 to the
right, resulting in a lower intersection point and thus a lower equilibrium quantity—the familiar
tradeoff for a monopolist. The next step is to compute the profit-maximizing price. The result
o ft h e s ec a l c u l a t i o n si sp r o v i d e db yP r o p o s i t i o n8 ,p r o v e di nt h eA p p e n d i x .




λ), quantity is Q∗
v = δ(1−
√
λ), flow profit is Π∗
v = hδ(1−
√
λ)2, and flow welfare
is W ∗
v = hδ(1 −
√
λ).
In view of Propositions 7 and 8, we can compare the firm’s incentives to develop a drug
treatment versus a vaccine:
Proposition 9. In the steady state of the dynamic model, the firm’s profit is higher with a drug
treatment than a vaccine. The firm appropriates all the social surplus with a drug treatment but
only a fraction 1−
√
λ with a vaccine. The firm does not strictly prefer developing both a drug
treatment and a vaccine to developing a drug treatment alone.
The proof is a simply corollary of Propositions 7 and 8; the details are provided in the Appen-
dix. The drug treatment allows the firm to appropriate 100 percent of the social benefits since
consumers can be charged their maximum willingness to pay and there are no externalities. With
a vaccine, the firm does not serve all susceptibles since this would eradicate the disease and
eliminate future demand. Instead, the vaccine is priced such that only a fraction of susceptibles
are served. The unvaccinated susceptibles obtain a positive externality from other’s vaccinations,
and this benefit is not appropriated by the firm.
As Proposition 9 states, since the firm appropriates all social surplus with a drug treatment,
there is no additional benefit from also developing a vaccine. This justifies our implicit assump-
tion that the firm develops one medicine or the other but not both.
Analogous to the result in the static model of Section 2, we are able to obtain the result in the
p r e s e n td y n a m i cm o d e lt h a tt h er a t i oo fp r o f i tf r o mad r u gt r e a t m e n tt ot h ep r o f i tf r o mav a c c i n e
is unbounded. The key parameter is λ, which recall is interpreted as the initial proportion of
healthy individuals prior to the introduction of the vaccine. A disease that is initially quite rare
can be represented by the limit as λ approaches one. For such diseases, a drug treatment is
particularly profitable for the firm relative to a vaccine, and the fraction of social benefits the
vaccine producer is able to appropriate is particularly small.
Proposition 10. In the limit as the initial prevalence of the disease approaches zero, the ratio
of profit from drug treatment to vaccine grows without bound, i.e., limλ→1(Π∗
t/Π∗
v)=∞,a n d
the ratio of profit to social welfare from a vaccine goes to zero, i.e., limλ→1(Π∗
v/W∗
v)=0 .
22There is reason to think that, in practice, externality benefits may be quite large relative to
direct benefits. For example, in a randomized evaluation of a project in Kenya, Miguel and
Kremer (2003) find that school-based mass treatment with deworming drugs created substantial
externalities among both untreated students in the treatment schools and among children in neigh-
boring schools; the share of disease burden averted due to externalities in their study is estimated
at about 76 percent.10
4 Government Purchases
The previous sections have focused on the case of pharmaceutical sales on private markets.
However, at least in the case of vaccines, governments are the main purchasers, not private
parties. We argue in this section that our results are still applicable to the case of government
procurement as long as price negotiations between the firm and the government are influenced
by the threat point of what profits the firm would realize with private sales if negotiations with
the government broke down.
Suppose the firm and government engage in Nash bargaining over the sale of medicine j.
Assume they bargain after the firm has decided which medicine (j = v for vaccine, j = t for
drug treatment) to develop and has sunk its investment in R&D. For ease of comparison, we will
assume that this sunk cost is the same for either medicine. Assume the government’s objective
is to maximize consumer surplus and the firm’s is to maximize profit.11
Given these objectives, the “pie” over which the parties bargain equals social welfare at
socially efficient prices, denoted ˜ Wj. Note the difference between ˜ Wj and Wj defined earlier:
˜ Wj is social welfare when the medicine is consumed at the socially efficient level, whereas Wj
is social welfare given the amount of medicine that will be consumed at monopoly prices. Let
10See also the theoretical analysis of vaccine externalities in Boulier, Datta, and Goldfarb (2002).
11Assuming alternatively the government’s objective is to maximize social welfare, with equal weights given to
producer and consumer surplus, Nash bargaining would trivially result in all surplus being allocated to the firm.
23Πj be the monopoly profit and CSj the consumer surplus from the private sale of medicine j at
monopoly prices. Let Φj be the firm’s threat point in Nash bargaining and Γj be the government’s.
Then the Nash bargaining formula yields the following expression for the firm’s surplus:
1
2
( ˜ Wj + Φj − Γj). (11)
It is plausible to assume that the firm’s threat point is given by what it would earn if it sold to
the private market rather than the government.12 Under this assumption, Φj = Πj and Γj = CSj.
Substituting these threat points into equation (11), we have that the firm prefers to develop a
drug treatment to a vaccine if and only if ( ˜ Wt + Πt − CSt)/2 > ( ˜ Wv + Πv − CSv)/2, or upon
rearranging,
Πt − Πv > ˜ Wv − ˜ Wt − CSv. (12)
We have substituted CSt =0in condition (11), consistent with the fact that the firm ends up
extracting all consumer surplus in both the static model of Section 2 and the dynamic model of
Section 3.
Condition (12) shows that, even if medicines are procured by the government, there is a wedge
between social and private incentives that possibly distorts the firm’s development decision. There
is a range of cases in which ˜ Wv > ˜ Wt, so it is socially beneficial for the vaccine to be developed,
yet (12) holds so the firm instead develops the drug treatment. This range of cases may be
broad for two reasons: as shown in Propositions 6 and 10, the ratio Πt/Πv is unbounded, and
so the left-hand side of (12) may be large; furthermore, subtraction of the term CSv reduces the
right-hand side of (12) below ˜ Wv − ˜ Wt.
12There are of course other possibilities. For example, the government could hypothetically refuse to grant approval
for private sales of the medicine in the event of bargaining breakdown, implying Φj =0 . However, at least in the
United States (by far the largest single market), once approval is granted the U.S. government would not stop private
sales of the product.
24Our conclusions are essentially an instance of the familiar hold-up problem (Williamson
1975). The firm decides which medicine to develop prior to negotiating with the government.
Recognizing that it does not appropriate all the surplus in bargaining, the firm may distort its
decision to appropriate more surplus; thus the firm is concerned over how profitable the medicines
a r er e l a t i v et oe a c ho t h e ri nt h et h r e a tp o i n t ,i . e . ,o nt h ep r i v a t em a r k e t .
The analysis can be repeated assuming that vaccines are procured by the government but drug
treatments are sold on the private market. The firm would then compare the Nash bargaining
surplus from the vaccine ( ˜ Wv + Πv − CSv)/2 to the drug treatment profit Πt. After rearranging
and noting Wv = Πv + CSv, we see that the firm would prefer to develop a drug treatment to a
vaccine if and only if
Πt − Πv >
1
2
( ˜ Wv − Wv). (13)
The right-hand side of (13) is the difference between social welfare given the socially efficient
level of consumption and social welfare at the monopoly-price level of consumption, divided by
two. The left-hand side is again the relative profit advantage of a drug treatment, which all our
preceding results were directed toward showing can be large. Again, we have the result that the
firm may be biased against developing a vaccine even though vaccine development may be more
socially desirable.
One policy implication that emerges from this section is that there are advantages to the
government bargaining with the firm as early as possible in the development process, since this
will of course help protect the firm’s R&D from hold up by the government and thus enhance
investment. Our point here is that this will also encourage the firm to make the socially efficient
decision regarding which medicine to develop. In the model, if the bargain takes place before the
firm decides which medicine to develop, in equilibrium the firm will develop the vaccine precisely
when it is socially efficient to do so, i.e., when ˜ Wv > ˜ Wt. This provides one justification for
25advance purchase commitment programs of the type described by Kremer (2001).
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Numerous potential factors could induce firms to develop a drug treatment (administered after
patients contract the disease) rather than a vaccine (administered before), or vice versa, for a given
disease. One or the other may involve “easier science,” be cheaper to produce once developed,
or have fewer or less severe side effects. The interests of both consumers and firms are likely
to be aligned concerning all of these preceding factors: that is, consumers and firms are likely
to agree that a cheaper treatment is better as is one with fewer side effects. In this paper, we
identified more subtle issues that are present even if one abstracts away from all these preceding
factors. Drug treatments turn out to be better tools to extract consumer surplus than vaccines.
• Drug treatments emerge as better rent extraction tools than vaccines in a static model since
drug treatments are administered after consumers have contracted the disease and thus the
firm has more information about individual consumer’s valuations.
• Drug treatments emerge as better rent extraction tools than vaccines in a dynamic model
if vaccines are more likely to interfere with disease transmission than are drug treatments.
Since the people who benefit from the positive externalities of vaccination do not compen-
sate the firm for the benefits they receive from the vaccine, the firm earns more revenue
from drug treatments than from vaccines.
We showed that in both the static and dynamic models, the firm can make arbitrarily higher
revenue in percentage terms with drug treatments than with vaccines. Fitting two actual estimates
of the ex ante distribution of HIV risk—one a nationally-representative survey of HIV risk, the
other a detailed survey of individuals in several poor Houston neighborhoods—into our theoretical
framework, we demonstrated the empirical relevance of our theoretical results. In both samples,
26we calculated that the revenue-extraction properties of drug treatments would allow the firm to
earn considerably more, around twice the revenue, compared to vaccines. Incorporating dynamic
considerations suggests the ratio is likely to be even larger. Given the importance of technological
advances to public health, and the particular importance of vaccines for fighting disease in
developing countries, these results suggest a justification for public policies to increase investment
in vaccine R&D.
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v =a r g m a x
ˆ x∈[0,1]
{hˆ x[1 − F(ˆ x)]}.
Then, in view of equations (3) and (4),


















(xi − ˆ x
∗
v)dF(xi). (A1)
Both terms in expression (A1) are nonnegative. There cannot be a measure one of consumers
at ˆ x∗
v by maintained assumption. Thus there must be a positive measure on either a subset of
(0, ˆ x∗
v), in which case the first term in (A1) is positive, or on a subset of (ˆ x∗
v,1], in which case
the last term in (A1) is positive. In either case, Πt − Πv > 0. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
Curing the disease generates gross social welfare hE(xi) from an ex ante perspective. This is
also the revenue from a drug treatment, and profit since costs have been normalized to zero, by
equation (4). Hence the addition of a vaccine cannot increase the firm’s profit. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
A distribution of consumers into R risk classes involves parameters {mr}R
r=1 and {xr}R
r=1.T h e s e
2R parameters can be freely chosen to generate as high as possible a value of Πt/Πv subject to
mr ∈ (0,1) for all r =1 ,...,R;
PR







r=1 θr if r =1 .
(A2)
The definition of risk-class masses in equation (A2) produces a geometrically declining sequence.
As is easily seen, this definition respects the constraints mr ∈ (0,1) for all r =1 ,...,R and PR
r=1 mr =1 . Next, we set the risk-class probabilities {xr}R
r=1. We will set them so that the
firm makes the same revenue regardless of which risk class it decides to target with its vaccine
28pricing. Specifically, we will set xR =1and define the rest, {xr}
R−1








The left-hand side of equation (A3) is the revenue (and profit) from charging a price hxr and
selling the vaccine to risk classes r and higher. The right-hand side is the revenue (and profit)
from charging a price hxr+1 and selling to risk classes r +1and higher. As is easily seen, our
definition of {xr}R
r=1 respects the constraint 0 ≤ x1 ≤ ··· ≤ xR ≤ 1. From equation (4), we
have Πt =
PR
r=1 hmrxr. By construction implicit in (A3), we have Πv = hx1;t h a ti s ,i ti s

























θr−1 + ···+ θR−1.
We provided an argument previously for the first line. The second line holds by simple algebra.
T h et h i r dl i n eh o l d ss i n c ei ti se q u a l l yp r o f i t a b le to sell the vaccine to all consumers at price hx1
or to consumers in risk classes r and above at price hxr, so that hx1 = hxr(mr + ···+ mR),













This shows that for any ²>0, and for the definitions of the parameters in (A2) and (A3), we
can find θ > 0 such that Πt/Πv >R−². To prove Πt/Πv ≤ R for all distributions of consumers
29into R risk classes, note


















Hence Πt/Πv ≤ R. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8
As stated in the text, for a given price Pv, the rational-expectations equilibrium vaccine quantity
is given by the intersection of lines AA0 and BB0 in Figure 3. First we will compute the vaccine
demand correspondence AA0. The probability a newborn will ever become infected if he or
she is not vaccinated is βIv/(βIv + δ). Thus a consumer’s maximum willingness to pay for
the vaccine is hβIv/(βIv + δ). Consumers are indifferent between buying a vaccine and not
if Pv = hβIv/(βIv + δ), an equation which can be inverted to yield the cutoff infection level





0 if Iv < ˆ Iv
[0,1] if Iv = ˆ Iv
1 if Iv > ˆ Iv.
(A4)
Next, we will compute BB0, the infection level from the epidemiological model. By the equation















Maximizing flow profit PvQv with respect to Pv,w h e r eQv is given by (A6) yields a first-order
condition, which can be expressed as
P
2
v − 2Pvh + h
2(1 − λ)=0 .
30This is a quadratic equation with two solutions: Pv = h(1+
√
λ) and Pv = h(1−
√
λ). The first
solution exceeds h and thus would result in zero demand. We will thus use the second solution,
P ∗
v = h(1 −
√
λ).B y ( A 6 ) ,Q∗
v = δ(1 −
√
λ).H e n c e Π∗
v = P ∗
vQ∗
v = hδ(1 −
√
λ)2.T h e f l o w
social benefit from the vaccine, W∗
v, equals the foregone harm from the disease h times the flow
of newborns δ times the reduction in the proportion of infecteds in the population. From the
equation for I∗ in (8), the proportion of the population that is infected in the steady state with a































The first line holds by Proposition 7, the second line by simple algebra, the third line by
√
λ > 0






λ. To complete the
proof, note 100 percent of gross consumer surplus is extracted by the drug treatment, so there is
no additional benefit from also developing a vaccine. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 10


































31The first line holds by the expressions for profits in Propositions 7 and 8 and the remainder by
simple algebra. The second limit in the proposition is limλ→1(Π∗
v/W∗
v) = limλ→1(1 −
√
λ)=0 ,
where the first equality holds by Proposition 9. Q.E.D.
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34Table 1: Calculations of Vaccine Revenue for NHANES Sample
Fraction of Maximum
Number of Population in Price Inducing Quantity Vaccine
Partners (n) Risk Class Purchase (= φn) Sold Revenue
00 .1007 0φ 1.0000 0.0000φ
10 .7232 1φ 0.8991 0.8991φ
20 .0845 2φ 0.1759 0.3518φ
30 .0369 3φ 0.0914 0.2742φ
40 .0162 4φ 0.0545 0.2180φ
50 .0128 5φ 0.0383 0.1915φ
60 .0075 6φ 0.0255 0.1530φ
70 .0008 7φ 0.0180 0.1260φ
80 .0033 8φ 0.0172 0.1376φ
90 .0008 9φ 0.0139 0.1251φ
10 0.0029 10φ 0.0131 0.1310φ
12 0.0012 12φ 0.0102 0.1224φ
13 0.0004 13φ 0.0090 0.1170φ
14 0.0004 14φ 0.0086 0.1204φ
15 0.0025 15φ 0.0082 0.1230φ
19 0.0004 19φ 0.0057 0.1083φ
20 0.0025 20φ 0.0053 0.1060φ
27 0.0004 27φ 0.0028 0.0756φ
30 0.0004 30φ 0.0024 0.0720φ
50 0.0004 50φ 0.0020 0.1000φ
100 0.0004 100φ 0.0016 0.1600φ
111 0.0004 111φ 0.0012 0.1332φ
150 0.0004 150φ 0.0008 0.1200φ
255 0.0004 255φ 0.0004 0.1020φ
35Table 2: Calculations of Vaccine Revenue for Bell and Trevino Sample
Fraction of Maximum
Ex ante Population in Price Inducing Quantity Vaccine
Risk Class Risk Class Purchase Sold Revenue
0.0000 0.5852 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000
0.0625 0.1296 0.0625 0.4148 0.0259
0.1250 0.0667 0.1250 0.2852 0.0356
0.1875 0.0444 0.1875 0.2185 0.0410
0.2500 0.0185 0.2500 0.1741 0.0435
0.3125 0.0037 0.3125 0.1556 0.0486
0.3750 0.0185 0.3750 0.1519 0.0569
0.4375 0.0185 0.4375 0.1333 0.0583
0.5000 0.0185 0.5000 0.1148 0.0574
0.5625 0.0037 0.5625 0.0963 0.0542
0.6250 0.0000 0.6250 0.0926 0.0579
0.6875 0.0000 0.6875 0.0926 0.0637
0.7500 0.0148 0.7500 0.0926 0.0694
0.8125 0.0037 0.8125 0.0778 0.0632
0.8750 0.0148 0.8750 0.0741 0.0648
0.9375 0.0148 0.9375 0.0593 0.0556
1.0000 0.0444 1.0000 0.0444 0.0444
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